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Contribution will focus on safeguards as 
conditions of supply required by the Supplier 
-  IAEA safeguards required by international export control 
regimes (mostly NPT, NSG) 
-  Tailored made bilateral safeguards agreement between 
supplier and end user similar to the one offered by the US 
Authorities in the early fifties  
-  Possibility for IAEA to assume safeguards 
implementation of an bilateral Agreement as offered by 
article 12 of its Statutes 
-  Potential bilateral fall back agreement in case of  breach of 
IAEA safeguards agreement 
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Present contribution will strictly focus on IAEA 
safeguards required by international export 
control regimes as they could be concerned 
by the implementation of US/India civil 
cooperation agreement 
Two International export control regime will be 
analysis : 
o  NPT safeguards requirements 
o  NSG safeguards requirements 
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NPT conditions of supply for nuclear items 
(trigger list) 
Article III.2 : Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes 
not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable 
material, or (b) equipment or material especially 
designed or prepared for the processing, use or 
production of special fissionable material, to any 
non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, 
unless the source or special fissionable material 






Up to 1995: INFCIRC 66 was considered as sufficient to 
face article III commitment. 
NPT Review Conference 1995 modified article III 
commitment interpretation and adopted INFCIRC 
153 (CSA) as a condition of supply  
  Not strictly applicable to Nuclear Weapons States as 
  defined by NPT article IX 
  Confirmed by Zangger Committee Guidelines 
 Formally recognized by NPT participating states as 
 Article III interpretation body 
p6	

NPT Safeguards requirements and India	

India : 
- Not a NPT legally recognized nuclear weapons state as defined 
by article IX 
No possibilities to establish an tailored made safeguards 
agreement similar to 5 Nuclear Weapons States 
USA (INFCIRC 288), United Kingdom (INFCIRC 263) France (INFCIRC 
290)  China (INFCIRC 369) Russia (INFCIRC327) 
- CSA requirement for any transfers from any NPT Participating 
States 
CSA is based on the principle that all facilities and not on a 
dedicated list provided by the end user should be submitted 
to safeguards 
Before 95 transfers to India were authorized if covered by 
dedicated safeguard agreement (INFCIRC 66) 
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NSG conditions of supply for nuclear items 
(trigger list (INFCIRC254 Part.2)) 
Conditions of supply regarding safeguards 
requirements 
Article 4 (a) required 
1.  CSA agreement with IAEA into force 
2.  Completed recently by specific provisions in 
case of “withdraw from the NPT”  
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If article 4.a not applicable	

Grand Father clause (4c) 
Not applicable to (new) transfer to India 
Safety clause (4b) 
Requiring application of INFCIRC 66 
Use twice by Russia to transfer nuclear fuel to Tarrapur 
plant 
Has in the past face strong opposition from NSG 
Participating States considering that such transfer 
should not fall within such provision 
 If politically accepted by some NSG PS, does not 
resist to a legal analysis. 
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Article 4 not applicable to transfer to 
NWS 
Are NSG NWS definition broader that the 
NPT one? 
- NSG established in 78 in reaction to the first 
Indian test and to convince the different 
supplier in particular France not member at 
that time of NPT to adopt a common export 
control regime. 




If the answer is “yes” what could be the 
consequences on safeguards 
requirements?  
Safeguards requirements are not established by NSG 
Guidelines and will determine on case by case 
by Supplier State 
Nevertheless the current practise of the NSG 
demonstrate that the answer should be “No”  
Most of present NSG denials concern transfer to India, 
Pakistan, Iran and Israel 
